Kernel-PnP/Device-Configuration
C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP%4Configuration.evtxKernel-PnP manages the deepest layer of hardware connection on Windows - power routing, driver validation and device bus authorization. It fires before any user-mode component is aware that a device exists, making its timestamps the earliest and most authoritative connection anchors available in the entire Windows event log ecosystem.
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP/Device-Configuration - written by the kernel Plug and Play manager
General
Kernel-PnP (Plug and Play) is the OS component that arbitrates direct hardware access at the kernel level. When a device is connected to the system bus, Kernel-PnP is responsible for allocating resources, selecting the appropriate driver and authorizing the device before any higher-level service or user-mode process can interact with it. The events it generates include the device instance path, hardware IDs and compatible IDs - the same identifiers that appear in the USBSTOR registry key. Because this logging occurs at the kernel level, it cannot be influenced by user-space processes and provides the most reliable connection timestamps available for physical device tracking.
Traces
The most forensically significant Event IDs in the Kernel-PnP log are:
| Event ID | Description |
|---|---|
| 400 | Device configuration started. The kernel begins enumerating the device and matching it against available drivers. Contains the hardware ID and device instance path. |
| 410 | Device started successfully. Confirms the device is now active on the system bus. The timestamp here is the earliest reliable proof of connection - preceding all user-mode activity by milliseconds. |
Forensic Value
- Establish the earliest connection timestamp: Event ID 410 fires before any user-mode driver, filesystem or application is aware of the device, making it the most authoritative anchor for when a peripheral became active on the system.
- Detect HID attack devices: A USB HID (Human Interface Device) like a Rubber Ducky or BadUSB enumerates through Kernel-PnP milliseconds before any keystrokes are injected - the event timestamp directly precedes the attack activity.
- Extract hardware identifiers: The device instance path in events 400 and 410 contains Vendor ID, Product ID and serial number fields that directly correlate to USBSTOR registry entries for the same device.
- Corroborate multi-source USB timelines: Kernel-PnP timestamps serve as ground truth when cross-validating against SetupAPI logs, StorageVolume events and USBSTOR registry last-write times for the same device connection event.